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Emergence and spread of SARS-CoV-2 lineage
B.1.620 with variant of concern-like mutations
and deletions
Distinct SARS-CoV-2 lineages, discovered through various genomic surveillance initiatives,
have emerged during the pandemic following unprecedented reductions in worldwide
human mobility. We here describe a SARS-CoV-2 lineage - designated B.1.620 - discovered
in Lithuania and carrying many mutations and deletions in the spike protein shared with
widespread variants of concern (VOCs), including E484K, S477N and deletions HV69Δ,
Y144Δ, and LLA241/243Δ. As well as documenting the suite of mutations this lineage
carries, we also describe its potential to be resistant to neutralising antibodies, accompanying
travel histories for a subset of European cases, evidence of local B.1.620 transmission in
Europe with a focus on Lithuania, and significance of its prevalence in Central Africa owing to
recent genome sequencing efforts there. We make a case for its likely Central African origin
using advanced phylogeographic inference methodologies incorporating recorded travel
histories of infected travellers.
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-26055-8 OPEN
A full list of authors and their affiliations appears at the end of the paper.









Over a year into the pandemic and with an unprecedentedreduction in human mobility worldwide, distinct SARS-CoV-2 lineages have arisen in multiple geographic areas
around the world1–3. New lineages are constantly appearing (and
disappearing) all over the world and may be designated variant
under investigation (VUI) if considered to have concerning
epidemiological, immunological or pathogenic properties. So far,
four lineages (i.e. B.1.1.7, B.1.351, P.1 and B.1.617.2 according
to the Pango SARS-CoV-2 lineage nomenclature4,5) have been
universally categorised as variants of concern (VOCs), due to
evidence of increased transmissibility, disease severity and/or
possible reduced vaccine efficacy. An even broader category
termed variant of interest (VOI) encompasses lineages that are
suspected to have an altered phenotype implied by their mutation
profile.
In some cases, a lineage may rise to high frequency in one
location and seed others in its vicinity, such as lineage B.1.177 that
became prevalent in Spain and was later spread across the rest of
Europe2. In others, reductions in human mobility, insufficient
surveillance and passage of time allowed lineages to emerge and rise
to high frequency in certain areas, as has happened with lineage
A.23.1 in Uganda6, a pattern reminiscent of holdover H1N1
lineages discovered in West Africa years after the 2009 pandemic7.
In the absence of routine genomic surveillance at their origin
location, diverged lineages may still be observed as travel cases or
transmission chains sparked by such in countries that do have
sequencing programmes in place. A unique SARS-CoV-2 variant
found in Iran early in the pandemic was characterised in this way8,
and recently travellers returning from Tanzania were found to be
infected with a lineage bearing multiple amino acid changes
of concern9. As more countries launch their own SARS-CoV-2
sequencing programmes, introduced strains are easier to detect
since they tend to be atypical of a host country’s endemic SARS-
CoV-2 diversity, particularly so when introduced lineages have
accumulated genetic diversity not observed previously, a phenom-
enon that is characterised by long branches in phylogenetic trees. In
Rwanda, this was exemplified by the detection of lineage B.1.3806,
which was characteristic of Rwandan and Ugandan epidemics at the
time. The same sequencing programme was then perfectly posi-
tioned to observe a sweep where B.1.380 was replaced by lineage
A.23.16, which was first detected in Uganda10, and to detect the
country’s first cases of B.1.1.7 and B.1.351. Similarly, sequencing
programmes in Europe were witness to the rapid displacement of
pan-European and endemic lineages with VOCs, primarily B.1.1.7
(e.g. Lyngse et al.11).
Given the appearance of VOCs towards the end of 2020 and
the continued detection of previously unobserved SARS-CoV-2
diversity, it stands to reason that more variants of interest (VOIs),
and perhaps even VOCs, can and likely do circulate in areas of
the world where access to genome sequencing is not available nor
provided as a service by international organisations. Lineage
A.23.110 from Uganda and a provisionally designated variant of
interest A.VOI.V29 from Tanzania might represent the first
detections of a much more diverse pool of variants circulating in
Africa. We here describe a similar case in the form of a lineage
designated B.1.620 that first caught our attention as a result of
what was initially a small outbreak caused by a distinct and
diverged lineage previously not detected in Lithuania, bearing
multiple VOC-like mutations and deletions, many of which
substantially alter the spike protein.
The first samples of B.1.620 in Lithuania were redirected to
sequencing because they were flagged by occasional targeted PCR
testing for SARS-CoV-2 spike protein mutation E484K repeated
on PCR-positive samples. Starting April 2nd 2021, targeted
E484K PCR confirmed a growing cluster of cases with this
mutation in Anykščiai municipality in Utena county with a total
of 43 E484K+ cases out of 81 tested by April 28th (Supplementary
Fig. S1). Up to this point, the Lithuanian genomic surveillance
programme had sequenced over 10% of PCR-positive SARS-
CoV-2 cases in Lithuania and identified few lineages with E484K
circulating in Lithuania. During initial B.1.620 circulation in
Lithuania the only other E484K-bearing lineages in Lithuania had
been B.1.351 (one isolated case in Kaunas county, and 12 cases
from a transmission chain centred in Vilnius county) and
B.1.1.318 (one isolated case in Alytus county), none of which had
been found in Utena county despite a high epidemic sequencing
coverage in Lithuania (Supplementary Fig. S2).
An in-depth search for relatives of this lineage on GISAID12
uncovered a few genomes from Europe initially, though more
continue to be found since B.1.620 received its Pango lineage
designation which was subsequently integrated into GISAID. This
lineage now includes genomes from a number of European
countries such as France, Switzerland, Belgium, Germany, Eng-
land, Scotland, Italy, Spain, Czechia, Norway, Sweden, Ireland,
and Portugal, North America: the United States (US) and Canada,
and most recently The Philippines and South Korea in Asia.
Interestingly, a considerable proportion of initial European cases
turned out to be travellers returning from Cameroon. Since
late April 2021, sequencing teams operating in central Africa,
primarily working on samples from the Central African Republic,
Equatorial Guinea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon
and lately the Republic of Congo have been submitting B.1.620
genomes to GISAID.
We here describe the mutations and deletions the B.1.620
lineage carries, many of which were previously observed in
individual VOCs, but not in combination, and present evidence
that this lineage likely originated in central Africa and is likely to
circulate in the wider region where its prevalence is expected to be
high. By combining collected travel records from infected patients
entering different European countries, and by exploiting this
information in a recently developed Bayesian phylogeographic
inference methodology13,14, we reconstruct the dispersal of line-
age B.1.620 from its inferred origin in the Central African
Republic to several of its neighbouring countries, Europe and the
US. Finally, we provide a description of local transmission in
Lithuania, France, Spain, Italy, and Germany through phyloge-
netic and phylogeographic analysis, and in Belgium through the
collection of travel records.
Results
B.1.620 carries numerous VOC mutations and deletions.
Lineage B.1.620 attracted our attention due to large numbers of
unique mutations in B.1.620 genomes from Lithuania in next-
clade analyses (its genomes are 18 mutations away from nearest
relatives and 26 from reference strain Wuhan-Hu-1), and those
genomes initially being assigned to clade 20A, corresponding to
B.1 in Pangolin nomenclature4,5. Meanwhile, Pangolin (using the
2021-04-01 version of pangoLEARN) variously misclassified
B.1.620 genomes as B.1.177 or B.1.177.57 and occasionally as
correct but unhelpful B.1, prior to the official designation of
B.1.620 by the Pango SARS-CoV-2 lineage nomenclature team.
To this day even after official designation Pangolin still often
struggles with B.1.620 sequences and classifies them as various
VOCs (often as B.1.1.7) when not used in the new UShER mode
and vice versa sometimes classifies non-B.1.620 genomes as
B.1.620. Closer inspection of B.1.620 genomes revealed that this
lineage carries a number of mutations and deletions that have
been previously observed individually in VOCs and VOIs (Fig. 1
and Supplementary Fig. S3), but had not been seen in combi-
nation. Despite sharing multiple mutations and deletions with
known VOCs (most prominently HV69/70Δ, LLA241/243Δ,
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S477N, E484K and P681H), lineage B.1.620 does not appear to be
of recombinant origin (Supplementary Fig. S4).
Through travel-related cases of B.1.620 discussed later we
suspected Cameroon as the immediate source of this lineage and
therefore sought to identify close relatives of this lineage there.
While genomic surveillance in Cameroon has been limited, the
genomes that have been shared on GISAID are quite diverse and
informative. A handful appears to bear several mutations in
common with lineage B.1.620 and could be its distant relatives
(Fig. 1). Synonymous mutations at site 15324 and S:T1027I
appear to be some of the earliest mutations that occurred in the
evolution of lineage B.1.620, both of which are found in at least
one other lineage associated with Cameroon (B.1.619), followed
by S:E484K which also appears in genomes closest to lineage
B.1.620. Even though the closest genomes to B.1.620 were
sequenced from samples collected in January and February,
lineage B.1.620 has 23 changes (mutations and deletions) leading
up to it compared to the reference. During this study, SARS-CoV-
2 genomes collected in January-March 2021 from the Central
African Republic were deposited on GISAID, but none of them
resembles forebearer or sibling lineages to B.1.620.
B.1.620 is likely to escape antibody-mediated immunity. Like
most currently circulating variants, B.1.620 carries the D614G
mutation, which enhances infectivity of SARS-CoV-2, likely through
enhanced interactions with the ACE2 receptor by promoting the up-
conformation of the receptor-binding domain (RDB)15. Furthermore,
B.1.620 contains P26S, HV69/70Δ, V126A, Y144Δ, LLA241/243Δ
and H245Y in the N-terminal domain (NTD) of the spike protein.
The individual V126A and H245Y substitutions are still largely
uncharacterised to the best of our knowledge, but might be coun-
terparts to the R246I substitution in B.1.351, and the latter may
interfere with a putative glycan binding pocket in the NTD16. All
other mutations of B.1.620 in the NTD result in partial loss of
neutralisation of convalescent serum and NTD-directed monoclonal
antibodies17. This indicates that these mutations present in B.1.620
may have arisen as an escape to antibody-mediated immunity18. The
spike protein of B.1.620 also carries both S477N and E484K muta-
tions in the RBD, but in contrast to other VOCs not the N501Y or
K417 mutations. Like the mutations in the NTD, S477N and E484K
individually enable broad escape from antibody-mediated
immunity18. Moreover, deep mutational scanning experiments have
shown that these substitutions also increase the affinity of the RBD
for the ACE2 receptor19. Both S477N and E484K occur on the same
flexible loop at the periphery of the RDB-ACE2 interface20.
We have modelled the RBD–ACE2 interface with the S477N and
E484K substitutions using refinement in HADDOCK 2.421.
These models show that both individual substitutions and their
combination produce a favourable interaction with comparable
scores and individual energy terms to the ancestral RBD
Fig. 1 Lineage-defining SNPs of lineage B.1.620. Only SNPs that differentiate B.1.620 (genomes outlined with a dashed line) from the reference (GenBank
accession NC_045512) and that are shared by at least two B.1.620 genomes are shown in the condensed SNP alignment. Sites identical to the reference are
shown in grey, changes from the reference are indicated and coloured by nucleotide (green for thymidine, red for adenosine, blue for cytosine, yellow for
guanine, dark grey for ambiguities, black for gaps). The first 100 and the last 50 nucleotides are not included in the figure but were used to infer the
phylogeny. If a mutation results in an amino acid change, the column label indicates the gene, reference amino acid, amino acid site, and amino acid change
in brackets. The phylogeny (branch lengths in the number of mutations) on the right shows the relationships between depicted genomes and was rooted
on the reference sequence with coloured circles at the tips indicating the country from which the genome came. Posterior probabilities of nodes leading up
to lineage B.1.620 are shown near each node with the long branch leading to lineage B.1.620 labelled as ‘B.1.620’.
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(Supplementary Fig. S5). Whereas S477N may modulate the loop
conformation22, E484K may introduce new salt bridges with E35/E75
of ACE2. These results indicate that B.1.620 may escape antibody-
mediated immunity while maintaining a favourable interaction with
ACE2. The remaining mutations in the spike protein—P681H,
T1027I and D1118H—are uncharacterised to the best of our
knowledge. Of these, P681H is also located on the outer surface of
the spike protein, directly preceding the multibasic S1/S2 furin
cleavage site23. In contrast, T1027I and D1118H are both buried in
the trimerisation interface of the S2 subunit24.
While only limited empirical data are available, they seem to agree
with the expectation that B.1.620 is likely to be antigenically drifted
relative to primary genotypes. A report presented to the Lithuanian
government onMay 22, 202125 indicated that amongst 101 sequenced
B.1.620 cases at the time, 13 were infections in fully vaccinated
individuals, five of whom were younger than 57 years old. Though
not systematised properly, sequencing indications for a substantial
number of SARS-CoV-2 genomes from Lithuania were available, of
which 213 were ‘positive PCR at least 2 weeks after the second dose
of vaccine’, of which 195 were B.1.1.7 and 12 were B.1.620. Since
detection of the first B.1.620 case on March 15, 2021, in Lithuania
~10,000 SARS-CoV-2 genomes were sequenced to date, 9251 of
which were B.1.1.7 and 248 of which were B.1.620. Thus B.1.620 is
found 2.4 times more often in vaccine breakthrough cases compared
to its population prevalence, whereas for B.1.1.7 this enrichment is
only 1.05-fold. Similarly, the frequency of B.1.620 across the five most
affected European countries (Lithuania, Germany, Switzerland,
France and Belgium) appears relatively stable though at a low level,
unlike B.1.1.7 which has been in noticeable decline since April–May
(Supplementary Fig. S6), presumably on account of increasing
vaccination rates and improving weather in Europe.
Local transmission of B.1.620 in Europe. Local transmission of
B.1.620 in Lithuania has been established as a result of mon-
itoring the outbreak in Anykščiai municipality (Utena county,
Lithuania) via sequencing and repeat PCR testing of SARS-CoV-2
positive samples for the presence of E484K and N501Y muta-
tions, as well as looking for S gene target failure (SGTF) caused by
the HV69Δ deletion. Genotypes identical to those found initially
in Vilnius and Utena counties were later identified by sequencing
in Panevėžys and Šiauliai counties, indicating continued trans-
mission of lineage B.1.620 in-country. Interestingly, a single case
in Tauragė county, Lithuania, identified by sequencing was a
traveller returning from France found to be infected with a dif-
ferent genotype than the main outbreak lineage in Lithuania
without evidence of onward transmission via local contact tracing
efforts or genomic surveillance.
In addition to an ongoing disseminated outbreak of B.1.620 in
Lithuania, genomes of this lineage have been found elsewhere in
Europe. Though derived from separate introductions from the
one that sparked outbreaks in Lithuania, other B.1.620 genomes
from Europe appear to indicate ongoing transmission in Europe,
with the clearest evidence of this in Germany and France, where
emerging clades are comprised of identical or nearly identical
genotypes (Fig. 2). Presenting evidence for local transmission in
Europe, B.1.620 genomes from countries like Spain and Belgium
(also see next section) were notably picked up by baseline
surveillance and thus are likely to represent local circulation,
though presumably at much lower levels at the time of writing.
Figure 2 shows the aforementioned local transmission clusters in
Lithuania, Spain (Vilassar De Mar, province of Barcelona), France
(see below), and Germany (state of Bavaria), amongst numerous
others.
In France, nine B.1.620 genomes (EPI ISL 1789089 - EPI ISL
1789097) were recently obtained from a large contact tracing
investigation of a single transmission chain. These infections in
the municipality of Pontoise (Val d’Oise department, to the
northwest of Paris) occurred in adults (ages 24–38) who were all
asymptomatic at the time of sampling. Additional infections in
Pontoise outside of this cluster occurred in four adults (ages
29–57) and form a monophyletic cluster with the other nine
infected individuals (Supplementary Fig. S4). The putative index
case for these infections has yet to be determined through contact
tracing at the time of writing but these cases clearly point to the
B.1.620 lineage circulating in the Val d’Oise department. These
infections seem to stem from local ongoing transmission in the
Île-de-France region, clustering with two patients ages 1 (sample
from a children’s hospital in Paris: Hôpital Necker-Enfants
malades) and 69. These infections in Île-de-France in turn cluster
with two infections from Le Havre (region of Normandy; 180km
from Pontoise), pointing to either a travel event from Normandy
to Île-de-France or possible local transmission in the north of
France (Supplementary Fig. S4).
B.1.620 likely circulates at high frequency in central Africa. In
the absence of routine surveillance at a location, sequencing
infected travellers originating from there constitutes the next
most efficient way to monitor distinct viral populations. This
has been used successfully to uncover cryptic outbreaks of Zika
virus in Cuba26 and SARS-CoV-2 in Iran at the beginning of the
pandemic13. The latter study describes a novel approach to
accommodate differences in sampling location and location of
infection, and is hence specifically targeted to exploit recorded
travel histories of infected individuals in Bayesian phylogeo-
graphic inference, rather than arbitrarily assigning the origin of
the sample to either location. When we first compiled our
B.1.620 genomes dataset we had seven genomes from travellers
and six were sampled in the Central African Republic (CAR)
near the border with Cameroon, indicating the most plausible
geographic region where B.1.620 is circulating widely to be
central Africa (Supplementary Fig. S7). Neighbours of countries
reporting local B.1.620 circulation (Cameroon, CAR, DRC,
Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and later the Republic of Congo)
have either not submitted genomes to GISAID during the
study period (Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, Burundi) or have
epidemics dominated by SARS-CoV-2 lineages that are not
B.1.620 (Supplementary Fig. S8).
The collected individual travel histories themselves point to
several independent introductions of B.1.620 into Europe, with
documented cases of infected travellers returning from Cameroon
to Belgium, France and Switzerland, and from Mali to Czechia
(Fig. 3). We note that the metadata for a returning traveller from
Cameroon to Belgium (EPI_ISL_1498300) presents evidence of
ongoing local transmission within Belgium of B.1.620. Whereas
this patient had spent time in Cameroon from the 16th of January
until the 7th of February, a positive sample was only collected on
the 15th of March, 2021. Even when assuming a lengthy
infectious period of up to twenty days27, this patient’s infection
can not stem from his prior travel to Cameroon, which indicates
an infection with B.1.620 within Belgium and hence stemming
from contact within the patient’s community. Additionally, two
Belgian patients (EPI_ISL_1688635 and EPI_ISL_1688660) were
likely infected by the former’s niece who had travelled with her
family to Cameroon and tested positive upon their return to
Belgium. These findings are reinforced by more recent samples
from Belgium, for which no travel history could be recorded and
the patients declared not having left the country.
Using a Bayesian phylogeographic inference methodology that
accommodates individual travel histories we were able to reconstruct
location-annotated phylogenies at both the continent and country
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levels. Figure 4A shows the MCC tree of the continent-level
phylogeographic analysis, which yields 99.5% posterior support for
an African origin of lineage B.1.620. From this inferred African
origin, the variant then spread to different European countries via
multiple introductions, which is confirmed by our collection of travel
history records for individuals returning to these countries.
Subsequent country-level phylogeographic analysis—shown in
Fig. 4B—points to central Africa as the likely origin of this lineage,
with the Central African Republic receiving posterior support of
80.5% and Cameroon 16.8%, taking up 97.3% of the probability mass
together. Assuming a Central African Republic origin, the variant is
estimated to have spread to Europe via a series of introductions,
confirming what was also observed in our recorded travel history
records. Interestingly, a single Lithuanian case—a returning traveller
from France—does not cluster with the cluster of remaining
sequences from Lithuania, illustrative of at least two independent
introductions of lineage B.1.620 into Lithuania. Figure 4B also shows
multiple separate B.1.620 introduction events from central Africa into
the United Kingdom and the United States.
Air passenger flux out of Cameroon and Central African
Republic (Fig. 5) shows that many travellers had African
countries as their destination, including many that have not
reported any B.1.620 genomes to date. This suggests that B.1.620
could be circulating more widely in Africa and its detection in
Europe has mostly occurred in countries with recent active
genomic surveillance programmes. Detections of B.1.620 in
African states neighbouring Cameroon and Central African
Republic (Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, DRC and lately the
Republic of Congo), even at low sequencing levels, suggest that
B.1.620 may be prevalent in central Africa. We find this apparent
rise to high frequency and rapid spread across large areas of
Africa noteworthy in light of other findings reported here, namely
that currently available B.1.620 genomes appeared suddenly in
February 2021 (Fig. 3), are genetically homogeneous (Fig. 2), and
to date have no clear close relatives (Fig. 1).
Discussion
In this study, we have presented evidence that a SARS-CoV-2
lineage designated B.1.620, first detected in Europe in late Feb-
ruary, is associated with the central African region, where it
appears to circulate at high prevalence, and has been introduced
Fig. 2 Maximum-likelihood tree of lineage B.1.620 in Europe. Relationships between B.1.620 genomes, coloured by country of origin (same as Fig. 1) with
a thicker coloured outline indicating the country of origin for travel cases. At least ten genomes shown (samples collected in Belgium, Switzerland, France
and Equatorial Guinea) are from individuals who returned from Cameroon, one is from a traveller returning from Mali and one Lithuanian case returned
from France. Genomes from the Central African Republic (CAR) and Czechia (returning traveller from Mali) are descended from the original B.1.620
genotype, while the genome from Equatorial Guinea is already closely related to genomes found in Europe and happens to be a travel case from Cameroon.
Each genome is connected to the available geographic location in Europe with the smallest circles indicating municipality-level precision, intermediate size
corresponding to county-level information (centred on county capital) and largest circle sizes indicating country-level information (centred on country
capital). Countries are assigned the same colours as in Figs. 1 and 3.
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into Europe, North America, and Asia on multiple occasions. A
fair number of known B.1.620 genomes that were sequenced in
Europe stem from travel-related cases returning from Cameroon
(Fig. 3), and recently sequenced genomes from CAR and
Cameroon similarly belong to lineage B.1.620, suggesting that the
central African region is likely to be the immediate source of this
lineage. Importantly, our findings are quite insensitive to the
actual sequence data used. Older datasets we used dating from the
end of April 2021 (Supplementary Fig. S9) included only six
genomes from CAR and travel cases in Europe coming from
Cameroon and yet still confidently identified Cameroon as the
immediate origin of lineage B.1.620. Adding more data from CAR
(Supplementary Fig. S10) made available later made the Central
African Republic the more likely country where B.1.620 circulated
prior to spreading elsewhere, but ultimately no country other
than CAR and Cameroon are considered as remotely plausible by
the model.
Substantially higher passenger flux out of Cameroon compared
to CAR (practically an order of magnitude) is a likely explanation
for why B.1.620-infected travellers were overwhelmingly coming
to Europe from Cameroon. So far the only observation that is
difficult to explain is the Czech case returning from Mali, since
Mali is over 1000 km away from Cameroon. We consider the
introduction of B.1.620 from central Africa to Mali via land
routes improbable, since outbreaks caused by B.1.620 have not
been observed in Niger and Nigeria, the countries separating the
region from Mali. The lack of any B.1.620 genomes from Nigeria
in particular, one of the leaders in SARS-CoV-2 genome
sequencing on the continent to date, despite higher civil air
passenger volumes (Fig. 5) suggests other means of long-distance
travel between central Africa and Mali28,29.
In addition to the multiple introductions of the B.1.620 lineage
we observe (Fig. 3) and estimate (Fig. 4) in Europe and North
America, we also found evidence of local transmission of this
lineage in Europe, with clearest evidence in Lithuania (Supple-
mentary Fig. S1) followed by Germany and France (Fig. 3), and
finally, Belgium and Catalonia, where B.1.620 genomes were
picked up by baseline surveillance and infected individuals did
not report having travelled abroad. B.1.620 is worrying for several
reasons—its genomes are genetically homogeneous—as it
appeared suddenly in February 2021 bearing a large number of
VOC-like mutations and deletions in common with multiple
VOCs (Supplementary Fig. S3), yet in the absence of any clear
close relatives or sampled antecedents (Fig. 1). The discovery of a
novel lineage bearing many mutations of concern and with
indications that they are introduced from locations where
sequencing is not routine, is concerning and such occurrences
may become an alarming norm.
The continued lack of genomic surveillance in multiple areas of
the world, let alone equitable access to vaccines to drive trans-
mission down, will continue to undermine efforts to control
SARS-CoV-2 everywhere. Without the ability to identify unusual
variants, to observe their evolution and learn from it, and to
evaluate how vaccine-induced immunity protects against them,
any response enacted by individual countries is reactive and,
much like the process of evolution that generates variants of
concern, short-sighted. The emergence of B.1.1.7 was unprece-
dented and has had a devastating impact on the state of the
pandemic, so it is concerning that similar information gaps in
global genomic surveillance still persist to this day. As an example
we have shown that B.1.620 lacks intermediate relatives, resulting
in a long branch that connects this lineage to the ancestral gen-
otype of B.1. This could be the result of gradual but unsampled
evolution, perhaps even far away from central Africa, but it could
have also happened due to unusual selection pressures in
immunosuppressed individuals30 which is hypothesised for line-
age B.1.1.7. The long branch leading to B.1.620 also means that
we can not reconstruct the order of mutations that have occurred
during the genesis of this lineage and therefore whether some
amino acid changes have allowed others to happen by altering the
fitness landscape via epistatic interactions31. Given the number of
VOC-like mutations B.1.620 has, this is a significant loss.
Our work highlights that global inequalities, as far as infectious
disease monitoring is concerned, have tangible impacts around
the world and that until the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic is brought to
heel everywhere, nowhere is safe for long. Additionally, we
highlight the importance of collecting and sharing associated
metadata with genome sequences, in particular regarding indi-
vidual travel histories, as well as collection dates and locations, all
of which are important to perform detailed phylogenetic and
phylogeographic analysis. We only observed one single instance
where a GISAID entry was accompanied by travel information
and had to request such information for all the samples in our
core dataset by contacting each individual lab. Whereas many
labs were quick to provide the requested information, we were
certainly not able to retrieve all related individual travel histories.
Fig. 3 Known locations and travel history of B.1.620 cases. Collection dates of B.1.620 genomes are shown for each country (rows). Genomes from
travellers are outlined with colour indicating travel of origin (e.g. dark red for Cameroon) and connected to a smaller dot indicating which country’s
diversity is being sampled at the travel destination. Bars at the top indicate the number of genomes of B.1.620 available for a given date across all countries.
Countries are assigned the same colours as in Fig. 1.
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The scientific community therefore still faces the important task
of reporting and sharing such critical metadata in a consistent
manner, an aspect that has been brought to attention again
during the ongoing pandemic32,33.
Methods
Study design. This study was initiated upon detection of SARS-CoV-2 strains in
Lithuania bearing spike protein amino acid substitutions E484K, S477N and
numerous B.1.1.7-like (HV69/70Δ and Y144Δ) and B.1.351-like (LLA241/243Δ)
deletions, amongst others. In Lithuania, repeat PCR testing of SARS-CoV-2 posi-
tive samples is occasionally carried out to detect N501Y, E484K and S gene target
failure (SGTF) caused by the HV69Δ deletion. Upon detection of E484K-positive
cases, samples were redirected to sequencing. Initially identified cases of B.1.620
were mistakenly classified by pangolin as B.1.177 or B.1.177.57, while nextclade34
assigned it to clade 20A rather than the expected 20E (EU1), while highlighting that
B.1.620 sequences bore many unique mutations compared to the closest sequence.
Searching GISAID for mutations E484K, S477N and HV69/70Δ, which are found
in numerous VOCs individually but not in combination, identified additional
genomes that contained other mutations and deletions found in B.1.620.
We downloaded all available sequences of this lineage from GISAID in July
2021, and identified members that clearly belonged to this lineage. Prior to official
lineage designation as B.1.620, most of its genomes could be identified by the
presence of spike protein E484K and S477N mutations and the HV69/70Δ deletion.
Some of B.1.620 genomes were excluded from phylogenetic analyses because they
were misassembled (e.g. hCoV-19/Belgium/UZA-UA-24912930/2021 is missing
deletions characteristic of this lineage but has the mutations) or had too many
ambiguous sites (e.g. hCoV-19/France/ARA-HCL021061598501/2021) but we
recovered travel information about them regardless as this may prove useful to
perform travel history-aware phylogeographic reconstruction13.
SARS-CoV-2 whole-genome sequencing. Every sample that tests positive for
SARS-CoV-2 by PCR in Lithuania with Ct values < 30 may be redirected by the
National Public Health Surveillance Laboratory to be sequenced by the European
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), Vilnius University Hospital
Santaros Klinikos (VUHSK), Hospital of Lithuanian University of Health Sciences
Kauno Klinikos (HLUHSKK), Vilnius University Life Sciences Centre (VULSC) or
Lithuanian University of Health Sciences (LUHS). Samples of this particular
lineage were sequenced by ECDC using in-house protocols, infrastructure and
assembly methods, VUHSK using Illumina COVIDSeq reagents, Illumina MiSeq
platform, and assembled with covid-19-signal35, HLUHSKC using Twist SARS-
CoV-2 Research Panel reagents, Illumina NextSeq550 platform, and assembled
with V-pipe36, LUHS using ARTIC protocol, Oxford Nanopore Technologies
MinION platform, and assembled using ARTIC bioinformatics protocol for SARS-
CoV-2, and VULSC using ARTIC V3 protocol combined with Invitrogen Collibri
reagents, Illumina MiniSeq platform, Illumina DRAGEN COVID Lineage com-
bined with an in-house BLAST v2.10.18-based assembly protocol. Samples from
CAR were sequenced using the very same ARTIC V3 protocol as the Lithuanian
University of Health Sciences (LUHS).
Fig. 4 Maximum clade credibility trees of lineage B.1.620 coloured by reconstructed location using the latest available data as of June 2021. A Global
phylogeny of SARS-CoV-2 genomes with branches coloured by inferred continent from a Bayesian phylogeographic analysis that makes use of individual
travel histories. Lineage B.1.620 is outlined and a horizontal bar shows the posterior probability of its common ancestor existing in a given continent. Africa
is reconstructed as the most likely location (posterior probability 0.995) where B.1.620 originated. The 95% and 50% highest posterior density (HPD)
intervals for the most recent common ancestor date of lineage B.1.620 are indicated with violin plots centred on the common ancestor. B Phylogeny of
lineage B.1.620 with branches coloured by inferred country from a Bayesian phylogeographic analysis that makes use of travel histories. A vertical bar
shows posterior probabilities of where the common ancestor of B.1.620 existed. In this analysis, Central African Republic (CAR) and Cameroon are
reconstructed as the most likely locations (with posterior probabilities of 0.805 and 0.168, respectively) of the common ancestor of lineage B.1.620. Larger
white dots at nodes indicate nodes with a posterior probability of at least 95%, while smaller grey circles indicate nodes with a posterior probability of at
least 50%. The 95% and 50% highest posterior density (HPD) intervals for the most recent common ancestor date of lineage B.1.620 are indicated with
violin plots centred on the common ancestor.
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All SARS-CoV-2 genomes used here were downloaded from GISAID. A
GISAID acknowledgement table containing all genome accession numbers is
included with this study as Supplementary Data 1.
Associated travel history. When available on GISAID as part of the uploaded
metadata, we made use of this associated metadata information and contacted the
submitting labs to determine precise travel dates. For all other cases, we retrieved
individual travel histories by contacting the submitting labs—who then, in turn,
contacted either the originating lab or the patient’s general practitioner—for any
travel records they may have available. This resulted in travel itineraries for 10
patients, with 7 of these also containing detailed dates for the recorded travel.
When a returning traveller visited multiple countries on the return trip, we
included all visited countries as possible locations of infection by using an ambi-
guity code in the phylogeographic analysis13,14. The travel history information
collected can be found in Supplementary Table S1. While we were able to retrieve
travel history for a fair number of cases, this information is considered private
information in certain countries and we were hence unable to retrieve such data for
a subset of our sequences.
SARS-CoV-2 genomes from the United Kingdom (UK) make up a sizeable
proportion of any phylogenetic and phylogeographic analysis, given significant
sequencing efforts by the COVID-19 Genomics UK Consortium. Given the lack of
individual travel histories for B.1.620 genomes from England in our dataset, we
investigated the passenger volumes from all airports in Cameroon and the Central
African Republic to all airports internationally, incorporating volumes from both
direct and connecting flights between December 2020 and April 2021, from the
International Air Transportation Association (IATA37). These passenger data
cover the time frame of our estimated B.1.620 lineage since its origin (see ‘Results’
section), with the passenger volumes for February having become available at the
time of writing as these data need to be retrieved and processed. These air
passenger flux data reveal a very real possibility of missing travel histories from
Cameroon for B.1.620 cases in England, given that over 98% (i.e. 852 out of 867) of
the passengers from Cameroon to the UK during this time frame had an English
airport (London, Manchester or Birmingham) as their final destination. At the time
of writing, information on the origin of B.1.620 infections detected in England is
not available.
Modelling RBD–ACE2 interaction. We have modelled the RBD–ACE2 interface
with the S477N and E484K substitutions using the final refinement step of
HADDOCK 2.421. We used the crystal structure of ACE2 (19-615) bound to SARS-
CoV-2 RBD (PDB ID: 6m0j20) as a starting point and introduced the substitutions
using UCSF ChimeraX38. We used default parameters for refinement with exten-
ded molecular dynamics (MD) simulation (steps for heating phase: 200, steps for
300K phase: 2500, steps for cooling phase: 1000).
Phylogenetic and phylogeographic analysis. We combined 614 sequences
belonging to lineage B.1.620 with sequences from lineages that have circulated in
Lithuania at appreciable levels: B.1.1.7, B.1.1.280, B.1.177.60 and other VOCs that
share mutations with lineage B.1.620: B.1.351, P.1 and B.1.526.2. We included
high-quality sequences from Cameroon that were closest to lineage B.1.620 as well
as the reference SARS-CoV-2 genome NC_045512. Some sequences had clusters of
SNPs different from the reference at the ends of the genome, particularly the 5′ end.
In such cases, the ends of the genomes were trimmed to exclude these regions of
likely sequencing or assembly error. This resulted in a core set of 665 genomes,
which is visualised in Supplementary Fig. S4, that serves as the starting point for
our phylogenetic and phylogeographic analyses. This core set was subsequently
combined with 250 randomly selected sequences from the Nextstrain global ana-
lysis on April 29, 2021 (https://nextstrain.org/ncov/global34) to provide context for
the B.1.620 analysis, plus an additional two reference sequences: Wuhan/Hu-1/
Fig. 5 Total air passenger flows out of Cameroon (top) and Central African Republic (bottom) between December 2020 and April 2021. Destination
countries are sorted by total passenger volume arriving from Cameroon and Central African Republic (CAR) combined, coloured by continent (Europe in
light blue, North America in dark blue, Africa in green, and Asia in red) and limited to countries where at least 100 passengers have arrived from either
Cameroon or CAR between December 2020 and April 2021. Note the nearly order of magnitude greater passenger flux out of Cameroon compared to the
Central African Republic (CAR). Numbers above each country’s bar indicate the total number of genomes on GISAID from that country since January 1st
2021, according to GISAID’s 2021-07-02 metadata release. Bars outlined in black represent countries that have submitted at least one B.1.620 genome as
of June 2021.
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2019 and Wuhan/WH01/2019. We filtered these sequences based on metadata
completeness and added an additional four Chinese sequences as well as eight non-
Chinese sequences from Asia spanning both A and B lineages, in order to balance
the representation of different continents in our analyses. These sequences were
aligned in MAFFT (FFT-NS-2 setting)39 with insertions relative to reference
removed, and 5′ and 3′ untranslated regions of the genome that were susceptible to
sequencing and assembly error trimmed. We employed TempEst40 to inspect the
dataset for any data quality issues that could result in an excess or shortage of
private mutations in any sequences, or would point to assembly or any other type
of sequencing issues.
To look for sequences that could resolve the long period of unobserved
evolution separating lineage B.1.620 from its closest relatives, we constructed a
BLAST nucleotide database41 of all contemporary SARS-CoV-2 lineages available
via GISAID (accessed 2021-07-01, n= 2, 038, 838). We queried this database using
a synthetic B.1.620-like sequence containing SNPs and deletions shared by
B.1.620 sequences England/CAMC-13B04C1/2021 and France/PDL-IPP07069/
2021 that were not present in the reference sequence Wuhan/Hu-1/2019. The
synthetic query sequence was primarily comprised of ambiguous nucleotides (N)
except for 100 nt surrounding each mutation or deletion characteristic of B.1.620.
We checked the top 500 matches to see if the mutations they carry, their pango
lineages or phylogenetic placement via IQ-TREE42—using a general time-reversible
substitution model with among-site rate variation (GTR+Γ443,44)—could identify
sequences closer to lineage B.1.620 than B.1.619. No such sequences were
identified.
We performed Bayesian model selection through (log) marginal likelihood
estimation to determine the combination of substitution, molecular clock and
coalescent models that best fits the data. To this end, we employed generalised
stepping-stone sampling (GSS45) by running an initial Markov chain of 5 million
iterations, followed by 50 path steps that each comprise 100,000 iterations,
sampling every 500th iteration. We found that a combination of a non-parametric
skygrid coalescent model46, an uncorrelated relaxed clock model with underlying
lognormal distribution47 and a GTR+Γ4 substitution model provided the optimal
model fit to the data. We employed Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampling to
efficiently infer the skygrid’s parameters48.
We subsequently performed a discrete Bayesian phylogeographic analysis in
BEAST 1.10.549 using a recently developed model that is able to incorporate
available individual travel history information associated with the collected
samples13,14. Exploiting such information can yield more realistic reconstructions
of virus spread, particularly when travellers from unsampled or under-sampled
locations are included to mitigate sampling bias. When the travel date for a
sample could not be retrieved, we treated the time when the traveller started the
journey as a random variable, and specified normal prior distributions over these
random variables informed by an estimate of time of infection and truncated to
be positive (back-in-time) relative to sampling date. As in previous work13,14, we
used a mean of 10 days before sampling based on a mean incubation time of
5 days50, a constant ascertainment period of 5 days between symptom onset and
testing51, and a standard deviation of 3 days to incorporate the uncertainty on the
incubation time.
In our phylogeographic analysis, we made use of Bayesian stochastic search
variable selection (BSSVS) to simultaneously determine which migration rates are
zero depending on the evidence in the data and infer ancestral locations, in
addition to providing a Bayes factor test to identify migration rates of
significance52. We first performed a continent-level phylogeographic analysis by
aggregating sampling locations as well as the individual travel histories that
occurred between continents. To ensure consistent spatial reconstruction regardless
of sampling, we fixed the root location of this tree to be in Asia—so as to match the
known epidemiology of the COVID-19 pandemic. Conditional on the results of
this analysis, we performed a country-level analysis on the B.1.620 lineage and its
parental lineage, in order to substantially reduce the computational burden and
statistical complexity associated with having 87 sampling locations in a travel
history-aware phylogeographic analysis. We made use of the following prior
specifications for this analysis: a gamma (shape = 0.001; scale = 1000) prior on the
skygrid precision parameter, Dirichlet (1.0, K) priors on all sets of frequencies (with
K the number of categories), Gamma prior distributions (shape = rate = 1.0) on
the unnormalized transition rates between locations52, a Poisson prior (country
level: λ= 28; continent level: λ= 5) on the sum of non-zero transition rates
between locations, a CTMC reference prior on the mean evolutionary rate and as
well as on the overall (constant) diffusion rate53. In the country-level analysis, we
assumed a normally distributed root height prior on the time of origin of B.1.620’s
parental lineage, with a mean on the 27th of February 2020 and standard deviation
of 2 weeks, as derived from the corresponding internal node’s 95% highest
posterior density interval in the preceding continent-level analysis. For continent-
level analysis 18 independent Markov chains were set up, running for ~50 million
states and sampling every 40,000th state. All 18 runs were then combined after
removing 10% of the states as burnin, giving a total MCMC length of 810 million
states. For country-level analysis 16 independent Markov chains were set up,
running for ~3.5 million states and also sampling every 40,000th state. All 16 runs
were then combined after removing 10% of the states as burnin, giving a total
MCMC length of 50.4 million states. Both continent-level and country-level
combined run were inspected using Tracer v1.754 to confirm that effective sample
sizes (ESSs) for all relevant parameters were at least 200. We used TreeAnnotator to
construct maximum clade credibility (MCC) trees for both posterior sets of trees
and used baltic (https://github.com/evogytis/baltic) to visualise it.
In addition to sophisticated phylogeographic analyses, we also depict the raw
relationships between SARS-CoV-2 in the core dataset of 665 genomes using
substitution phylogenies. Figure 2 and Supplementary Fig. S4 depict maximum-
likelihood phylogenies inferred from the core dataset using PhyML55 under
the HKY+Γ4 model of nucleotide substitution44,56 which was then rooted on the
reference sequence. To occupy less space in Fig. 1 the number of B.1.620
genomes was reduced down to a representative set of 27, and a phylogeny was
inferred using MrBayes v3.257 under the HKY+Γ4 model of nucleotide
substitution44,56 and rooted on the reference sequence. MCMC was run for 2
million states, sampling every 1000th state and convergence confirmed
by checking that effective sample sizes (ESSs) were above 200 for every
parameter.
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature
Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
SARS-CoV-2 sequence data generated in this study have been deposited in the GISAID
database. These sequence data are available under restricted access due to GISAID’s
Database Access Agreement, access can be obtained by registering an account with
GISAID and downloaded via the list of accession used that we provide in the
supplementary GISAID acknowledgement table. The processed SARS-CoV-2 genome
data in the form of phylogenetic trees are available at https://github.com/evogytis/
B.1.620-in-Europe or under Zenodo https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5494346. The SARS-
CoV-2 genome data used in this study are available in the GISAID database under
accession codes provided in the supplementary acknowledgement table, https://
github.com/evogytis/B.1.620-in-Europe, and under Zenodo https://doi.org/10.5281/
zenodo.5494346. A list of GISAID accessions for genomes used here, as well as
phylogenetic trees used in figures, are available at https://github.com/evogytis/B.1.620-in-
Europeor under Zenodo https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5494346. To access sequence
data from GISAID one has to register an account with https://www.gisaid.org/, which
involves identifying oneself and agreeing to GISAID’s Database Access Agreement.
Code availability
Scripts used to generate figures are available at https://github.com/evogytis/B.1.620-in-
Europe or under Zenodo https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5494346. We provide the XML
files to perform the Bayesian phylogeographic reconstructions in BEAST 1.10.549 as
Supplementary Data 2.
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